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**POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS, A BASIS FOR MILITARY  
INTERACTION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES**

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18. Inter-American Military system.  
Objective civilian control. participatory control.

ITEM 19 -con-

19. The major findings include:

- The concept of "objective civilian control" by the Argentine military is obsolete and should be replaced with "participatory control."
- Politicians and the military should act as "boundary spanners" in the field of their interactions.
- The concepts of "military mind" and "victory" should be reconsidered.
- In terms of power, concepts of military jointness and civilian control oppose each other.
- Conflict theory should be studied by the military.
- After World War II, the United States military acted as a model for the Argentine military.
- In the 1960s, the "National Security and Development" doctrine was developed by the U.S. to fight communism (Alliance for Progress), and influenced the way by which the U.S. military deals with Latin American militaries. The doctrine encouraged the Argentine military to take a political role.
- Neither country recognized the other's wars.
- A new relative growth of the Inter-American Military System can be explained to cover a shared drug threat.
- The U.S. military must be careful in relations with its Latin American counterparts, to avoid "militarization" and the erosion of local politico-military relations.
- The role of the military should be to moderate conflict rather than enhance it. This assumption supposes a military skilled in political matters, subservient to civilian "participatory control." This way promotes democracy.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.

POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS, A BASIS FOR MILITARY  
INTERACTION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES

by

JULIO ENEAS GROSSO

Captain

Argentine Navy

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Newport, June 15, 1990

## Abstract

A theoretical review of civil-military relations theory is presented herein to analyze the political situation in Argentina, in an attempt to find the causes of coups and the proper place of the military within the political system. The case of the United States is also considered, to find some parallels from which to draw conclusions.

This paper analyzes the impact of military-military relations between Argentina and the United States, and attempts to establish a sound relation basis to affirm democracy in the South American country and, by extrapolation, to the region in general.

Although the scope of this topic was too broad to thoroughly cover within the available time, nonetheless it provides a framework for further research. Primary sources such as original documents were not explored due to a lack of time; therefore, the paper is based on secondary sources, such as books and articles written by specialists.

The major findings include the following:

"Objective civilian control" of the Argentine military is obsolete in any country and should be replaced by what is defined as "participatory control."

Politicians and the military should act as "boundary spanners" in the field of their interactions.

The concepts of "military mind" and "victory" should be reconsidered.

In terms of power, concepts of military jointness and civilian control oppose each other.

Conflict theory should be studied by the military.

After World War II, the United States military had strong impact as a model for the Argentine counterparts.

In the 1960's, the "National Security and Development" doctrine was sponsored by the U.S. polity in fighting communism (Alliance for Progress), but particularly by the U.S. military towards their Latin American counterparts. This doctrine encouraged Argentine military to take political roles.

Neither country recognized the other's wars.

A new relative growth of the Inter-American Military System can be envisioned if polity of the countries assesses the drug issue as a common threat.

The U.S. military must be careful in relations with their Latin American counterparts, to avoid "militarization" and the erosion of politico-military relations.

The role of the military, in general, should be to moderate conflict rather than to enhance it. This assumption supposes a skillful military in political matters, under civilian "participatory control." It is the way to promote democracy.

## PREFACE

The evidence of a serious failure in the political culture of Argentina, the repeated military interventions, and military involvement in government motivated me to search for some causes in Argentina's civil-military interaction pattern.

As a regular Argentine Naval Officer, I had no expertise in this subject and therefore found it necessary to develop a theoretical base. My current experience in the United States allowed me to explore the civil-military relations of this country and consequently acquire a basis for comparison. Finally, I was interested in analyzing military relations between the United States and Argentina as a way to assess the impact of this relationship on the South American country.

The term "military" is used in general and no distinctions between services has been made. The differences between services might provide new insights for future studies, however.

I have had the opportunity to interview Dr. Michael Freney, Secretary of the Navy Fellow from the Naval War College; Dr. George Fauriol from the Center of International Strategic Studies; Dr. Jack Child from the American University; and Major General Bernard Loeffke, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense



Board, all of whom provided interesting insights and bibliographical references that helped me enormously.

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"With strategy as the comprehensive direction of all forms of national power, of which military is only one, and with military force being used only for a political purpose, the rest begins to fall into logical shape."

RADM H.E. Eccles, 24 January 1979

POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS, A BASIS FOR MILITARY  
INTERACTION BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations, or more specifically politico-military relations, have always been a key aspect of national security policies. World history has countless cases of broken dialogue in that regard.

The "objective civilian control" of the military (Huntington, 1957, p.83) is the goal of well-inspired contemporary politicians. Nevertheless, it has not always been an aim easy to reach, due in general to mutual misunderstanding. Despite the real fact that both civilians and military are, first and foremost, citizens of the same country, they are members of two different "worlds" in which life experiences are very diverse.

Professionalism is the main concept to deal with if we are interested in establishing the proper place of the military in society. It is not an easy task.

History, traditions, development, sociopolitical environment, and obvious differences in the political culture within specific countries, all create a basic diversity that complicates perceptions and relations between those countries. Despite the peculiarities of each nation-state, the military mind has a common basis that can either help or complicate those perceptions and relations.

A comparison of the differences and similarities in civil-military relations in Argentina and in the U.S. is helpful to understand the effects of formal and informal inter-military linkage on the government of Argentina. The differences and similarities among the parallel services of each country also complicate those effects.

The Inter-American Defense Board, as top formal arena of U.S. and Argentine military interaction, will be partially analyzed to determine its profile and relation with its formal political structure, the Organization of American States (OAS).

Finally conclusions are drawn that help to provide a pattern to consolidate a pattern of stability in Argentina civil-military relations and to serve mutual interests of the two countries.

## CHAPTER I

### THEORY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Huntington's theory in civil-military relations is the only one in existence today as a whole body of knowledge (Huntington, 1957). Some of his perspectives have been analyzed to establish our own framework.

In my view, his most important premise or assumption is that any study of this kind in any society should be made as a system of interdependent elements.

"Any system of civil-military relations thus involves a complex equilibrium between the authority, influence and ideology of the military, on the one hand and the authority, influence and ideology of non-military groups, on the other." (Huntington, 1957, p. viii)

No such system will work properly unless politicians and soldiers in top ranks agree that they need each other and that any adequate civilian control of the military should be based on mutual confidence and respect.

The problems to be faced by statesmen have no clear-cut solutions. There is always a mixture of political, military, and economic aspects that must be considered thoroughly and simultaneously. Therefore, any military factor concerning the

top level is not only military but also political. The idea of separating them is impossible without being artificial or unreal and is excusable only for illustrative purposes.

The best approach is to understand each other's language. A two-way flow translation is mandatory and the concept of "interfaces" is applicable, as in communications theory. The diffuse boundaries between fields should be spanned in a way that allows reciprocal understanding, flexibility, and subsequent actions. The following paragraphs define terms that are necessary for further analysis.

#### 1. Military Profession.

Accepting that expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are the distinguishing characteristics of a profession, (Huntington, 1957, p.8), I agree that the vocation of officership in the military meets the following principal criteria.

a. Expertise. Expertise is acquired in the military through prolonged education and experience in the difficult field of "the management of violence." Because actual fighting in war is the exception, only second-hand experience is available, mostly acquired by learning through history. Training exercises and war gaming also provide an imperfect way. Difficulties in



retrieving the actual facts of the past make it difficult to draw definite conclusions and impossible to create the exact situation to be faced in the future. However, we must accept this semi-theoretical approach as the only one available.

b. Responsibility. The professional soldier is an expert who performs a service essential to the functioning and even the very existence of society: security. As a manager of violence, he will be involved in countering any expression of other violence (external or internal) that threatens the nation-state. Although the legitimate government, which monopolizes force, is ultimately responsible, the officer corps is primarily responsible to society from the military point of view of security. "His behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state." (Huntington, 1957, p. 17) His responsibility to the state is the responsibility of the expert adviser.

c. Corporateness. The membership in the services is vocational and volunteer, limited to a certain number, and the entrance is, in general, possible only at the lowest level of the ladder. Rank resides in the individual and reflects his professional achievement, measured in terms of experience, seniority, education, and ability. The military institution has its own history, tradition, costumes, and glories; individuals

within the institution are socially identified by a uniform that they wear with pride. As in any other associational profession, through written codes of ethics, each individual is confronted with the problem of proper conduct towards "clients" (society in our case) and colleagues. Some other moral obligations to the corporation are oral and less formal, transmitted during the socializing process, which sometimes creates real dogmas.

## 2. Professionalism.

The role of the military in society is defined in terms of power. The proper equilibrium must be established, in order to provide for political control of the military.

The concept of "professionalism" is important to understand or define its role. The term "control" indicates the legitimate attribute of the government to exercise its power in the political arena (ideas and symbols) by using the military capability (management of violence), in accordance with an established rationale, to reach the ends set by the government.

Huntington defines "subjective civilian control" as a way to maximize civilian power. Because of the intrinsic diversity and conflicting interests within society, only power of a particular civilian group can be enhanced. In brief, the civilians in

government or those who are struggling to be in office try to induce the military to accept their cause by politicizing and compromising them with their ideology. In my view, Huntington fails to recognize (I assume as a way to simplify the analysis) that not only civilians respond to differences of opinion. He idealizes the military as a solid and cohesive group, which is not the case in the real world. Nonetheless, I agree that military minds share common values in a broad sense.

Objective civilian control, in Huntington's view, supposes maximizing military professionalism and:

"More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps." (Huntington, 1957, p.83)

Huntington writes that, by being "militarized," or restrained from political participation, the military becomes the tool of the state. Its participation in politics is the denial of an independent military sphere and is the antithesis of the objective control, which in turn is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism. Going a little further, Huntington added that:

"Demand for objective control had come from the military profession, the demand for subjective control from the multifarious civilian groups anxious to maximize their power in military affairs." (Huntington, 1957, p.84)

These concepts are based on the idea that professionalizing the military renders it politically sterile and neutral. In my opinion, neutrality is the only ideal goal, but the supposed "sterile" stance for me is not conceivable in a Western democracy. It is impossible to accept that in looking for neutrality the military mind should avoid any political reference when war in itself is essentially political. The military is not independent; it is immersed in the political problem as much as war or conflict is a political matter.

"The most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political, and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society."  
(Huntington, 1968, p.194)

This quotation reenforces my idea that he is wrong when he advocates an independent military and at the same time accepts the intrinsic political condition of society of which military men are a part. This is clear when the military represents its own society in war.

War is the undesirable situation in which the military should be prepared to act and is probably the time when its advice is needed the most by politicians.

"War is an act of policy. . . , a true political instrument. . . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." (Clausewitz, 1976, p.87)

Therefore, the military at the higher levels will always be linked to polity; its duty is to provide technical advice to politicians, with a political insight in a common language, in other words, with shared concepts. Some politization of the military and some militarization of the politicians is needed in that respect.

The only way to rationality (relationship between means and ends) is to consider the factors of the situation together, not as separate entities. If both aspects are separated, then we break rationality in its very sense. This point is a key to understanding the need for political intervention of the military in the decision process. In theory, at any stage of conflict, in war or peace, this relationship of mutual understanding is preferable; however, during higher levels of tension, the need for adequate communication becomes more obvious.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger said:

**"Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our troops, who would have an understandable opposition to being used - in every sense of the word - casually and without intent to support them fully. Surely the lack of respect and gratitude we showed to our brave Vietnam veterans was one of the low points in U.S. history. It must not happen again."**

War could be the tool of the state, but not the military! <sup>1</sup>

In brief, professionalism of the military includes political skills. Robert Previdi summarizes the Vietnam example in the following way:

"Vietnam was a Washington mistake. The executive branch failed to establish a sound political policy on which to win a war. The President and the Secretary of Defense meddled too much in military tactical detail. The double negative here is that neither President Johnson nor Secretary McNamara understood their critical role in supervising and evaluating strategic military plans. The Joint Chiefs failed in two ways. First, they left the war to be run by the field commanders. Second, they never told their civilian leaders that the war was not winnable using the strategy they had selected. Congress failed because it did not get involved until it was too late to prevent so much of the tragedy." (Previdi, 1988,p.93)

The example of Vietnam can be used to demonstrate the need for a two-way dialogue; top military leaders should not only accomplish orders of polity under "objective control," but also should be accountable to present military views under a political perspective as a way to help correct decisions to be made. On the other hand, politicians must have not only a political view of conflict and war but also some strategic military insights to understand the problem; they must control the military but let it participate in the decision process.

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<sup>1</sup>I consider the Kantian "categorical imperative" and the moral compulsion in taking others not as means but as ends in themselves.

### 3. Professionalization and politicization.

Professor R. D. McKinlay, lecturer of the University of Lancaster, England, in a conference on "The Perceived Role of the Military" held in France in September 1971, presented interesting concepts related to the means of control of the military, its level of participation in political activity, and its motivating factors (Van Gils, 1971, p.247). In my view, his ideas complement Huntington's framework in analyzing those relations. He argues that three dimensions must be considered in approaching civil-military relations: the means of control, the level of military political behavior, and the factors motivating the military.

a. Means of Control. In the first dimension, he considers three categories:

(1) Voluntary control could be either formal, if the prescriptive regulations of non-intervention are enough, or informal, if the military has been socialized or internalized with nonpolitical values.

(2) When control is imposed, it could be through insulation of the military personnel from political activity, inhibiting them from voting or affiliating with political

parties, or extremely reducing size of the military through budget cuts. The other way to impose control is by infiltration or, in other words, an overlap of interests created at the top of the military hierarchy by means of class or ideology. This latter subcategory, in my view, coincides with Huntington's "subjective control."

(3) The last category is the case in which both military and civilian control fail. In this case, a small armed group unites around a local leader and usurps the powers of the government or imposes its own ideals.

McKinlay supports the idea that the three categories are not mutually exclusive and that all the elements of control can be combined in a particular case.

b. Level of political activity by the military. The second dimension is considered a continuum, on which three major points may be located:

(1) The first point is where the military acting only as a pressure group with lobbying capability.

(2) The second point is where the military actively participates in the decision-making process, which the author



calls "conjunction." In addition, the degree of conjunction may range from a more limited position,

"...to a more inclusive level in which the scope of the military policy decision making expands and the dominance of the civilian element concomitantly declines." (Van Gils, 1971, p.249)

(3) The third point is total intervention, involving the explicit assumption and direction of major governmental offices by the military and the expulsion of the civilian occupants of these posts.

c. Factors motivating the military for political intervention. The last dimension can be described as four "complexes."

(1) Personal or individual, when the number of persons involved is limited.

(2) Organizational, when the military's orientation to political action is derived in terms of the interests of the organization as a whole.

(3) National sectional, when the military responds to a sector's popular demands, but clearly goes beyond its sphere of influence, in which case, the military action can have direct effect on the whole population.

(4) National, when the military goes beyond its sphere of influence, in responding to massive popular demands. In this case, two conditions should be met: (1) the end of the activity must lie outside the military's own occupational sphere and (2) this activity must be in consonance with the interests and demands of the whole population.

McKinlay's professionalization is simply a reiteration and reenforcement of Huntington's idea of profession. However, in my view, an interesting point arises when, in establishing the relation of this concept to civil-military relations and the means of control, McKinlay stated:

"It has frequently been assumed that the spontaneous development of military controls means that the military completely withdraws itself from politics. However, this assumption is largely fallacious, for not only does professionalization not exclude a political role but it may also precipitate such a role." (Van Gils, 1971, p.252)

Considering the level of intervention, the pressure group seems to be a natural relation between the military and the government through a civilian as Minister of Defense. During national crisis or war, conjunction seems to be also legitimate; **just sharing values with politicians in a national emergency:**

"Given that guardianship of national security is the primary function of the military, whenever such security is in jeopardy either from internal or external sources, the military is legitimately obliged to take action." (Van Gils, 1971, p.253)

It is very difficult to establish a fluid dialogue in a crisis situation unless it already exists at that moment. It must be established before a crisis arises. In addition, it seems reasonable to state that, the greater the security threat, the more dominant the military conjunction role. A wide range of variation should be expected, with the main source of conflict being the intrinsic ambiguity or difficulty in identifying and assessing the threat.

The other level of possible military political action is in government takeovers. McKinlay accepts this dramatic type of political action as being consonant with military professionalism when civilian policy infringes on the professionalization of the military, invading their internal autonomy or threatening their efficiency and consequently jeopardizing security. The other possibility McKinlay foresees is when:

"...the civilian polity is unable to constitute the source of social responsibility for the military's professional allegiance." (Van Gils, 1971, p.254)

If the government is not able to attain one of its major goals (namely policy formation), if it has become corrupt, or, in short, it is not able to function, then:

"...in either case the end result is the same, namely that no responsible central authority exists, and to this extent national security may be endangered and the military may legitimately intervene." (Van Gils, 1971, p.254)

In McKinlay's view, in the final dimension (factors that motivate the military political performance), only the national motivation is in consonance with professional military political activity at the conjunction and take-over levels. In my opinion, this condition significantly reduces legitimate military intervention. Again, the difficulty in assessing when "national motivation" exists is the conflict's focus and the basis to consider any military intervention, a real exception and a historical curiosity in an organized country.

McKinlay develops the summary concept of politicization as a way to cover a degree of variation in professionalization for civil military relations.

"Politicization is the process involving either the inculcation of values and opinions or the expression of action towards the polity based on such values, which lies outside the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of competence of any organization." (Van Gils, 1971, p.255)

This definition implies, in the view of Van Gils, that politicization can be of two very different types: overt and induced. The former represents the deliberate drive by the polity to inculcate extra-military political values into the armed forces; despite the same end product, the second differs in

the process of acquiring the values because it is induced spontaneously through the general process of interaction.

Depending on the case, overt politicization is not antithetical to professionalization, but it is a deviation in some degree affecting institutional autonomy. Although in one-party regimes it is probably a common way to control the military, in communist countries some resistance has been manifest among the armed forces against a high degree of politicization. Nevertheless, only in the ideal world is it possible to consider an institution in a vacuum; in reality, certain dependencies always exist. Overt politicization exercised by the government is a way of "subjective control" that invades clearly the sphere of competence of the military.

The induced politicization, which McKinlay assumes is acquired through a spontaneous process of interaction, in my view is not clearly separated from the overt type. He states that the former is a mild version of the latter (Van Gils, 1971, p.259). Instead of defining different qualities, which I think is useful for the analysis, he makes a differentiation in quantity or gradation. Interaction is natural interdependence and, from then on, an intrinsic political issue. The mutual influence that can be exercised in the relation is key: we cannot separate military and political issues. As we stated repeatedly, both perceptions are legitimate and the statesman must consider the adequate way

to focus the problem in accordance with his final perception. Disregarding the military perspective is as bad as disregarding the political one. The right blend will be determined only by the results ex-post facto; this is the political problem.

#### 4. The "moderating pattern".

The military has always been a significant factor in Latin America and too many times actually ruled those countries by taking over the government; we can name this case as the "intervention" model. There is a consensus in the region that military government "per se," is illegitimate, so the model to be supported by this idea can be the "apolitical" model. In an effort to find a model to be useful in analyzing some Latin American countries (Peru, Brazil, and Argentina), Alfrad Stepan developed an intermediate model, which he called the "moderating pattern":

"The key components in this pattern of civil-military relations may be summarized as follows:

a) All major political actions attempt to co-opt the military. A politicized military is the norm.

b) The military is politically heterogeneous but also seeks to maintain a degree of institutional unity.

c) The relevant political actors grant legitimacy to the military under certain circumstances: to act as moderators of the political process, and to check or overthrow the executive, or to avoid the breakdown of the system, especially one involving massive mobilization of new groups previously excluded from participation in the political process.

d) Approval given by civilian elites to the political heterogeneous military to overthrow the executive, greatly facilitates the construction of a winning coup coalition. Denial by civilians that the overthrow of the executive by the military is a legitimate act conversely hinders the formation of a winning coup coalition.

e) There is a strong belief among civilian elites and military officers that, while it is legitimate for the military to intervene in the political process and exercise temporary political power, it is illegitimate for the military to assume the direction of the political system for long periods of time.

f) This rough value congruence is the result of civilian and military socialization via schools and literature. The military doctrine of development is also roughly congruent with that of parliamentary groups. The military officers' social and intellectual deference facilitates military co-option and continued civilian leadership." (Stepan, 1971, p.64)

I think this model fits quite well in the Argentine's case, but some observations should be made. This "politized" military that Stepan mentioned is the product of mixing some sort of tradition with circumstances; in general, its political education or skills lack systematic study, and experience is gained by means of improvisation. High ranking officers must learn political science as a way to understand the problem in which the armed forces are involved. The reason is not to be better prepared to take over the government, but to discover the good reasons to avoid that.

## 5. Summary.

Conflicts do not recognize arbitrary separations as economic, political or military issues; those aspects are to be considered together in a holistic manner. Military profession includes a concept of professionalism that includes political skills for the top ranked officers. The military is not independent; nor sterile, and must walk a thin line between objectivity and intervention. It must be able to recognize where this limit is drawn, through political skills. In addition, being politically knowledgeable in political science would enhance understanding that this limit is not to be easily trespassed. The assumption or rejection of this clear idea differentiates organized from disorganized countries. The "moderating pattern" of Stepan will help to understand the next chapter, Argentine Civil-Military Relations.



## CHAPTER II

### ARGENTINE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

#### 1. Background

There is a saying within the Argentine Army that it was "born with the country." In fact, it was born before the country, because native regiments were formed during the First British Invasion in 1806 due to a Spanish manpower shortage. These regiments fought bravely and were a significant element in defeating the British in that invasion (also during the second one in 1807). As a matter of fact, those invasions and the successful outcome due to the indigenous capability to fight aided significantly in the revolution against Spain in 1810. Therefore, the Argentine Army can legitimately keep that saying, which proudly intermingles the founding of the army with the birth of the nation state.

Probably it is the root of the strong feeling in this service that the armed forces are the ultimate support of the authentic national interests against any force, indigenous or alien, that threatens those interests. The armed forces are

certainly the vivid expression of a nationality because they represent the national will to fight in defense of its survival. The questions are what are the limits in expressing that support and what are the mechanisms to be made operational.

The military in Argentina not only fought for independence but also contributed to the formation of the nation with extensive participation in political issues. After the war of the "Triple Alianza" against Paraguay, the "Conquest of the Desert" from Indian hands, and the pacification of the country, a conservative regime ruled the country until 1916. The richness of the land, foreign investment, a huge immigration, and primarily a close association with Great Britain, all elevated the nation to a privileged position among the countries of the world.

The electoral reform of 1912 led to the first popular president selected in legitimate elections in 1916. The previous period of fraud and unfair procedures among all the political parties came to an end. The Radical Party was prevalent and the period up to 1930 saw three constitutional presidents. At that time, a coup d'etat interrupted the constitutional period of economic expansion. The year 1930 is frequently taken as a cornerstone in Argentine history because it restarted a period of military intervention and political instability lasting more than 50 years. Between 1930 and 1989, six major coups disrupted the

democratic constitutional system (1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976). There were also several minor coup attempts but the democratic process was not interrupted.

The following outline summarizes the six major coups, including the circumstances surrounding each coup, an analysis made within the theoretical framework previously discussed, and conclusions drawn from that analysis.

a. 1930

(1) Circumstances

- (a) Despite his former popularity, President Irigoyen was an old, tired, and ill man, "on the verge of senility." (Potash, 1969, p.30)
- (b) The principal goal of the military head of the revolution was to change the representative government to a corporatist one <sup>2</sup> "and control the society by the most qualified elements." (Potash, 1969, p.43)
- (c) Military unrest was due to a flagrant favoritism in the treatment of military personnel who shared the political views of the party in office.

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<sup>2</sup>Corporative government: or political system in which the principal economic function, as banking, industry, labor and government are organized as corporate entities.

- (d) The effects of world economic collapse began to be felt in Argentina in 1930.
- (e) The opposition supported the coup.
- (f) The Federal Government intervened in four provinces and there was related fraud by local government to control the congressional election.
- (g) Internal questioning of the President's leadership arose in his own party.
- (h) Widespread indifference to the fate of the government existed among the majority of military officers and the general public.
- (i) Handling of military affairs was perceived to be inequitable.
- (j) Indifference to the military's desire for modern equipment was viewed as a failure to understand the nation's defense requirements.
- (k) General Uriburu, head of the military coup, had little respect for politicians.

## **(2) Analysis**

- (a) Mutual (polity-military) confidence and respect: lost.

- (b) Professionalization: general military perception that their national security responsibility was in jeopardy and their autonomy was violated. The mass of the armed forces did not counteract the coup with the use of their combat forces.
- (c) Politicization: induced.
- (d) Means of control: attempt to infiltrate the military.
- (e) Level of control: pressure group.
- (f) Motivation: personal (only a group) with corporative ideology.
- (g) Posture of government's political opposition: supported the coup. No popular reaction. President's authority questioned.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, the coup of 1930 was NOT justified.

b. 1943

(1) Circumstances:

- (a) President Castillo attempted to exploit the armed forces for partisan purposes and there was a reluctance of the majority of officers to be associated with another fraudulent election.
- (b) Some fascist-minded officers saw the totalitarian regimes of Germany, Italy, and Spain as useful models to reorganize Argentina.
- (c) The prospect of Patron Costas as the official candidate to the presidency roused deep-seated opposition among all the officers, both pro-Allied or pro-fascist.
- (d) Radical Party was participating; it was possible that General Ramirez would become President on a Radical Party ticket.
- (e) Political practices deteriorated, as reflected in the return to fraudulent provincial elections.
- (f) Political warfare arose between the President and the Chamber of Representatives, with the consequent paralysis of legislation and creation of tension.

- (g) A revolutionary state of mind existed among the officers; all sectors generally agreed to oust President Castillo.

(2) Analysis:

- (a) Mutual confidence and respect: lost.
- (b) Professionalization: general military perception that the government was not able to accomplish its objectives, that fraudulent practices would consolidate an unfair system, and that its autonomy was vulnerable. The majority of the officers chose corporateness, instead of cleavage and a major fight.
- (c) Politicization: induced.
- (d) Means of control: attempt to infiltrate the military.
- (e) Level of control: two pressure groups (pro-Allied and pro-fascists).
- (f) Motivation: personal (a group only) with totalitarian ideology.
- (g) Posture of government's political opposition: the Radical Party supported the coup.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, the coup of 1943 was NOT justified.

c. 1955

(1) Circumstances

- (a) Freedom was lost; minorities were harassed and civil rights belonged only to those who adhered to the doctrine of the party in office.
- (b) The government attacked the Roman Catholic Church, due to actions taken to counter the ideological penetration and moral relaxation in official youth centers.
- (c) Arrest of several priests and burning of some churches by Peronist demonstrators galvanized feeling in the opposition (Conservatives and Radicals) that the totalitarian regime had reached unacceptable extremes.
- (d) Congress approved of law providing modification of the Constitution, excluding participation of the Catholic Church in events of the State.



- (e) The signing of a contract with a United States oil company for the exploitation of an area in Patagonia was a "convenient target for those seeking to turn the military against the President (Potash, 1980, p.178). The opposition denounced the contracts "as the surrender of Argentine sovereignty over a huge part of national terrain." (Potash, 1980, p.179)

(2) Analysis

- (a) Mutual confidence and respect: lost.

Military

|                             |             |
|-----------------------------|-------------|
| perspective shared by a     | significant |
| part of population. The     | attack on a |
| Roman Catholic Church was a | catalyst.   |

- (b) Professionalization: military perception that the totalitarian regime had reached unacceptable limits. Typical subjective control by any kind of means and at all levels of society. Cleavage among the military, but government supporters not committed to extreme resistance.

- (c) Politicization: overt.

- (d) Means of control: infiltration of the military.
- (e) Level of control: conjunction.
- (f) Motivation: personal (group) with mixed ideology.
- (g) Posture of government's political opposition: strongly supported the coup.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, the coup of 1955 was NOT justified.

d. 1962

(1) Circumstances

- (a) Some members of the military openly spread the idea of military intervention. While it was denied that the armed forces should take part in partisan or factional struggles, the obligation to safeguard the nation's highest interests was encouraged:

"Nevertheless, when the authorities of the state, through incapacity or conscious errors in the exercise of power, show themselves to be powerless or ineffective in halting the spread of evils that damage the highest values of the nation endangering its very existence, the Armed Forces, in fulfillment of their specific mission, must intervene in defense of those values." (Potash, 1980, p.333, citing Colonel Romulo Menendez "Revista Militar" No. 660 April-June 1961)

- (b) An obsession existed among Army officers that the spread of communism in Cuba posed a real threat, not only to Argentine national security, but also to the very existence of the armed forces.
- (c) President Frondizi's policy of friendship towards Brazil aroused the concern of the Argentine military. Brazilian President Janio Quadros made public avowals of neutralism in terms of the rivalry between United States and the Soviet Union. This, along with undisguised sympathy towards developments in Cuba, contributed to the uneasiness of the military, whose traditional perception of their huge neighbor was that of permanent rival and potential foe. (Potash, 1980, p.338)
- (d) It was confirmed that Ernesto "Che" Guevara had a secret meeting with President Frondizi.
- (e) Refusal of the government to associate Argentina with the United States and the thirteen other states that voted for the immediate exclusion of Cuba from the Inter American System, raised the ire of the Argentine armed forces, brought denunciations

from the opposition press and political parties, and precipitated a serious crisis.

(Potash, 1980, p.345)

- (f) To some extent, the concept existed in the armed forces that:

"Democracies should not be so generous and should guard their existence even at the sacrifice of law, so to avoid the risk of collapsing in the hands of those who do not respect them." (expressed by Air Secretary Jorge Rojas Sylveira as cited by Potash, 1980, p.347)

- (g) Electoral victory of the Peronist candidate as governor of the important province of Buenos Aires aggravated the crisis. The military could not afford a Peronist governor and even the government was shocked with this outcome, which was foreseen by the armed forces but not by President Frondizi.

## (2) Analysis

- (a) Mutual confidence and respect: lost.
- (b) Professionalization: A general military perception that the government's foreign policy was endangering national security. Obsession

with the danger of communism; Reluctance to openness towards Brazil, which maintained a leftist posture.

- (c) Politicization: induced.
- (d) Means of control: voluntary formal.
- (e) Level of control: pressure group.
- (f) Motivation: personal (a group only), but inaction of the rest of the armed forces.
- (g) Posture of government's political opposition: inactive and no popular reaction.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, the coup of 1962 was NOT justified.

e. 1966

(1) Circumstances

- (a) The effectiveness of the government was questioned. The Commander in Chief of the Army, General Juan C. Ongania, was confident that without any political compromise, he would be able to accomplish what the constitutional government of President Illia could not.
- (b) Support of civilian intellectuals included ex-president Frondizi, who welcomed General Ongania.

(c) Faith in the democratic process was lost.

(2) Analysis

(a) Mutual confidence and respect: lost.

(b) Professionalization: military perception that the government was not able to accomplish its objective. No military active opposition or reaction to the coup.

(c) Politicization: induced.

(d) Means of control: voluntary formal.

(e) Level of control: pressure group.

(f) Motivation: personal, with the idea that democracy had failed and the assumption that military could do a better job.

(g) Posture of government's political opponents: moderate support.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, the coup of 1966 was NOT justified.

f. 1976

(1) Circumstances

(a) Political violence was at unprecedented heights and there was a sense that the government could no longer ensure physical security.

(b) A coup was anticipated and welcomed by most of the sectors of society, even Peronists.

Paradoxically, the extremist groups that had the most to lose apparently harbored the hope that another period of military government would make the Argentine populace more radical and pave the way to a revolutionary socialist regime. (Potash, 1980, p.380)

(2) Analysis

(a) Mutual confidence and respect: lost.

(b) Professionalization: perception of the military that the government could not control violence and was unable to govern.

(c) Politicization: induced.

(d) Means of control: voluntary formal.

(e) Level of control: pressure group.

(f) Motivation: national.

(g) Posture of government's political opposition:  
coup welcomed by the majority of the society.

(3) Conclusion: under the theoretical framework previously presented, and in my personal opinion, the coup of 1976 was the only one JUSTIFIED in the period. The significant difference from the others was that there was a national motivation or consensus to throw down the government. Nevertheless, due to perpetuation in power, the experience was disruptive, the political culture of the country was again damaged, and it ended in yet another failure of the military to rule the country.

The explanation of so many unsuccessful experiences of the military seems to be simple: they are not prepared for rule. But the overriding reason for failure as a country is the lack of statesmanship among the politicians, combined with a bad political environment which encourages the military to take these actions.

Potash understands quite precisely this circumstance in saying:

**"The fact that the military has periodically taken control is more an indication of the failures of the civil sector to stand united in defense of constitutional government than it is of military lust for power. In every one of the six interventions, a part and sometimes a very substantial part of public opinion has encouraged the armed forces to act. Leaders of practically**



every political party, trade unions, and business organizations have given their blessing on at least one occasion to the forcible ouster of an incumbent president. The notion that Argentine political parties or other important civilian groups have consistently opposed military takeovers bears little relation to reality."(Potash, 1980, p.381)

Five of the six coups (excluding the one of 1976) did not meet the previously established theoretical conditions to be justified. In all the cases, mutual respect and confidence were lost. The attempt to get subjective control of the military produced the contrary effect. Objective control could not be implemented because the military exercised its own rationality.

The military has been highly sensitive about its responsibility to guarantee national security. In general, it overestimated the external threat, but estimated well the internal one in 1976 when chaos was pervasive and the country was in fact without government.

The assumption that politicians were not able to rule the nation was manifested or obvious in all cases. The attempt to endure in power, up to the moment of reaching their own goals, was a new phenomenon after 1966, which is where the "moderating pattern" does not fit in the Argentine case. It probably would fit before 1966, when there was the intention to transfer the government to civilians, but the Onganía regime and its followers returned to democracy only when erosion was evident. In addition, the "National Reorganization Process" of 1976 was

maintained to "accomplish objectives and not deadlines" Those goals were never reached, and only after a total collapse did the regime give up.

The level of control as a pressure group was a common factor, with the exception of the coup of 1955, where conjunction was the result of overt politicization.

Motivation had a variety of ideological origins: corporateness, totalitarianism, mixed liberal<sup>3</sup> and nationalistic ideas, anti-communism, anti-democracy, and again anti-communism were the ideological grounds of the six analyzed coups, respectively. All had a common factor of non-democratic values.

## 2. The recent past.

At the beginning of the 1960's, there began what would become the wildest subversive war ever experienced in Argentina.

During the military government of General Onganía, as well as in the following constitutional period, terrorist cases

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<sup>3</sup>In Argentina the so called "liberals" are identified with the conservative forces. They reject governmental intervention and promote free market and enterprises. They are at the right wing of the ideological spectrum. The term must not be confused with the liberals in the United States where the liberals are at the left wing of the American political context.

increased. The country responded to the aggression with an obsolete legal system, which did not suffice to counter the unusual threat. In 1972, jails were full of suspected or condemned terrorists. In 1973, the Congress sanctioned an amnesty bill as a way to pacify the country, hoping that subversion without the anti-military argument, in a constitutional government, would change behavior. Contrary to official expectations, terrorists groups intensified their violent acts. Subversion promoted alien values to the Argentine people, spreading several Marxist interpretations. Youth groups were infiltrated and doubts were created in naive minds.

A typical strategy was to create chaos to pressure the armed forces to take over and recreate the conditions of 1972. After President Peron's death (July 1, 1974), his widow was in power and, through the Minister of Defense, gave the military the order to "annihilate" subversion. At that time, in the northern part of the country, a more conventional war was being fought in which terrorist groups had declared some areas of Tucuman province, paradoxically the cradle of our independence, as "liberated zones." They were doing this by means of a real occupation army with flags, uniforms, and a separate government. The outcome was hundreds of casualties among infantry troops of both sides, but the armed forces accomplished the mission directed by the constitutional government. Victory was gained in 1975 after several months of fighting. Defeated in rural areas, the

subversion attempted massive urban operations, where the terrain was more favorable.

The armed forces faced a peculiar war, with procedures being formulated during the fight and learned through mistakes and the experience itself. Command was centralized, but the execution decentralized, which provided effectiveness but also vulnerabilities. Both the authorities and the operational forces learned on the job.

Peron's death and the subsequent chaos produced by his inexperienced widow in office motivated the coup of March 24, 1976. From that point on, the military increased actions to counter violence. By the end of 1978, guerrilla groups had virtually ceased to function; the number of persons assassinated by these groups declined from about 1,500 in 1976 to 700 in 1977 and to 30 or so in 1978. Terrorist casualties were significant. The war was a military victory, but a political defeat, both internally and externally.

Several figures have been cited regarding the number of the "desaparecidos," from a high of 30,000 as provided by the subversive organizations down to only a few as provided by the military. More than a difference of inflating or deflating numbers, the problem is the definition itself of what a "desaparecido" really is. Many were killed by the subversives

themselves and others voluntarily "disappeared," changing their identities.

The so-called "dirty war," or struggle against subversion, was at the time supported by the general public. The methods used in the eyes of the military were justified by the nature of the threat, and civilians who knew about those procedures never raised complaining voices unless they were directly or indirectly involved in subversive actions.

In accordance with constitutional but changing norms of the "National Reorganization Process" (NRP), the newly nominated president faced political and union mobilization, a quickly deteriorating economic situation, the continuing problem of the struggle against terrorism, and the increasing loss of legitimacy in general. But the military in power did not give up when the goal of "annihilation" of subversion was accomplished.

The Malvinas/Falkland crisis and the following war would have been very different with a democratic government in office. In fact, it's possible that the war would never have taken place.

The most important decision of the crisis, the reoccupation of the islands, was made by few people. No congress or "War Powers Resolution Act" was involved. Even the staffs of the operational forces ignored "Operacion Rosario" up to hours before

execution. No constraints existed, no "checks and balances" to the "Junta" and some selected decision-makers. The military defeat resulted in the total collapse of the military government, produced a profound crisis of self-confidence in the armed forces, and discredited them in the eyes of the population at large. Transition to democracy was the natural outcome.

The military government had no influence over the choice of candidates or the election itself, and reserved neither powers nor veto prerogatives for the future. It was unable to guarantee either its autonomy in relation to the future constitutional government or the promise of a future military policy. Even less, it was unable to get the basis for an agreement on the ongoing struggle against the guerrillas or resolve the aftermath of the struggle. The position of the Armed Forces at that time meant

"...that they could be discarded; previously they were powerful political allies in the coup coalitions that have overthrown succeeding governments over the last 50 years." (Rouquie, 1981/82, thesis)

When democracy was reestablished in 1983, Marxist and leftist affiliations hardened the existing campaign against the former military government, denouncing flagrant violations of human rights.

Despite the fact that society knew about the circumstances and procedures under which the "dirty war" was fought, just a few voices of dissent were heard during the military rule (1976 to 1983). With the new constitutional government, this was not the case; it seemed that the same society blamed the military for human rights violations during the war, echoing the leftists. Distortion was such that it looked as though the subversives themselves would not have violated any human rights at all. This perception, justified or not, was the accepted outcome for numerous groups, rhetorically or truly democratic, indigenous or alien. Paradoxically the military defeat of subversion was the means to enjoy democracy again.

a. The Alfonsin administration.

During the 1983 election campaign, the Radical candidate Raul Alfonsin stressed his deep respect for the principles of both the rule and due process of law and also developed a theory regarding responsibility for the "dirty war." Once in power, he had to face the problem of fulfilling his campaign promises and at the same time not push the armed forces into a corner.

The long process of trials, bringing charges against more than 400 officers, ended with an invoked concept of "due obedience" proposed by the same administration and a law of "end

point"<sup>4</sup> in order to reduce the military unrest already manifest in some garrisons. In December 1985, the members of the first two "juntas" had been punished in accordance with their attributed responsibilities.

Alfonsin pursued development of a new role for the military, based on a nonpolitical version of professionalism. A new defense law was enacted in October 1986 in which "National Security Doctrine"<sup>5</sup> was jettisoned, making internal security a police function. In addition, no conflict hypotheses were established. All external threats were denied in the most bizarre and wishful fashion. Simultaneously, no "cease fire" was ordered and hostilities with the United Kingdom were maintained.

Alfonsin's strategy was based on breaking the link between the military or military factions and their civilian cliques. Of course, the Radical Party had learned well about coups because it had either suffered or encouraged them since it became a political party after a revolution in 1890. The "coup syndrome" was and is a well-internalized issue in the ideology of the Radical Party.

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<sup>4</sup>A proposed law that would amnesty numerous officers involved in trials about human rights violations.

<sup>5</sup> Discussed on page 86.



The Alfonsin administration also began exerting civilian control over the defense industries normally managed by the various armed services.

Another aspect of Alfonsin's strategy was the budgetary stringency, which impacted heavily on morale and combat capability. The restraint meant a decline in real purchasing power of military salaries.

On April 16, 1987, in Cordoba, a military officer due in court on charges of human rights violations became a fugitive from justice and took refuge with a paratrooper regiment. In Buenos Aires, an internal "planteo"<sup>6</sup> in the Army was led by LTC Aldo Rico supported by 100 officers, demanding that the military trials come to an end. The group was surrounded by loyal troops that were reluctant to act. A massive civilian protest, encouraged by the government, erupted, and President Alfonsin visited the rebel stronghold and convinced them to lay down arms. Although it seemed a victory for the President, Alfonsin bowed to rebel demands and dismissed the Army Chief of Staff. As a new pro-government general was nominated, unrest continued; within a week, the courts were suspending scheduled trials for human rights abuses.

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<sup>6</sup>"Planteo" is a regimental upheaval, an insubordination, insurrection, or mutiny demanding political changes from the government. A "planteo" does not develop into a coup or revolution.

All soldiers and cadets traditionally make an oath and swear to defend the flag of the country with their lives. In June 1987, the government ordered the armed forces to swear to defend the constitution of the country, as well as the flag. This was accomplished, but not without regret or complaint from the officers. They saw in that order evidence of submission to the government and a way to create compromises, not to the constitution itself but toward Alfonsín's administration.

On April 13, 1988, the Senate approved a new Defense Law, which basically precluded the military from intervening in internal security problems. But military unrest continued and a "planteo" rebelled again in Villa Martelli, this time under Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin. Again, the issue was raised of the honor of the armed forces and disagreement in the way the institution, instead of the men, was an object of mistreatment. There was complaint of a political propaganda campaign against the prestige of the Army and an exaggeration of the charges in the trials. This time, significant fights occurred, and the rebels were controlled only after a new "secret agreement" was made by the government.

On January 23, 1989, using heavy and sophisticated weaponry, about 50 civilians seized bloodily and mercilessly, in a very "professional" way, a military garrison in "La Tablada," located outside Buenos Aires. After the initial confusion and the first

reaction within the garrison and with the local police, the Army retook the garrison. The fight left 28 dead and 14 prisoners among the subversives, while the Army lost 8 men and the police lost 2. Several were wounded in both groups. In all, 36 hours of combat, including use of tanks and artillery, had been necessary to defeat the subversives.

The subversives spread fliers at the first moment of the attack; they honored COL Seineldin and LTC Rico, claiming that the actions were for the "honor of the armed forces" and against Marxism supported by the government. The flier was signed by the "New Argentine Army" and by the "Partido Politico de los Trabajadores" (Workers Political Party). Although the attackers were clearly Marxists, their intentions were not clear. Accusations were made that they tried to create a new and false "planteo," which would motivate the populace to claim a more radical and leftist approach by the military.

In a later public speech, the President recognized that the military and the police had acted bravely and that the only reason the problem was solved only because of their determination to fight against those subverting order. His statements could certainly have been taken as a public revision of the last **Defense Law**, which precludes the military from intervening in internal security matters and more extensively the whole "dirty war." In fact, all the "planteos" and this subversive attack

have been examples of the need to be prepared to employ armed forces internally.

Using the same framework as in analyzing the causes of the six main coups, the following analysis summarizes how the Alfonsin administration controlled the military:

- Mutual respect and confidence: lost.
- Professionalization: general military perception that the government was trying to destroy or at least neutralize the armed forces as a factor of power. Simultaneously, the military perceived their image had seriously deteriorated.
- Politicization: overt, trying to convince the military to stay away from the political process, especially internally.
- Means of control: imposed insulation and in great extent voluntary informal, due to the former traumatic experiences that produced the military internalization with nonpolitical values. During two occasions (Rico and Seineldin), some groups were out of both civilian and military control. They were imposing their own conditions, having the self-assumption that they represented the

armed forces in general and their honor in particular.

- Level of control: pressure group (with very low institutional power).

Motivation: organizational but from medium to lower levels, in accordance with evolution of trials and general perception of affected military honor and institutional survival.

- Posture of government's political opposition: supporting democracy. Shocked by the experience of "La Tablada," where the specter of subversion reappeared and the image of armed forces resulted, improved.

We can say that Alfonsín's administration controlled the military to a certain extent, and no "coup d'état" was experienced. However, the main reason for this was that there were no real intentions from the military, neither was there consensus among the opposition, in supporting any coup. On the contrary, some popular mobilization, encouraged by the government, opposed the "planteos" and confused them with coups, which they were not. Self-control of the military in general prevailed, except the cleavages of the more sensitive or radical groups.

Alfonsin was massively defeated by the Peronist candidate in the presidential election. This factor, added to the general situation of economic debacle and social unrest, obliged him to transfer his government "voluntarily", five months before the end of the regular period. The 6-year term was not completed, but this time the anticipated transfer of the government was not the product of a coup: it was due to the collapse of the Radical administration.

b. The Menem administration.

Contrary to expectations and to what was expressed in the political campaign, the new President is acting very pragmatically. Four months in office is probably not time enough to clearly evaluate his policy towards the military, but two important political moves are being made that concern the military: (1) the already materialized will to reestablish relations with Great Britain and also talks (sovereignty apart) about the Malvinas/Falkland conflict and (2) the enactment of a law, using the presidential faculty, to give amnesty to the majority of the prosecuted officers and terrorists. The second issue was only begun when President Menem had announced a further step, in which even the higher authorities in the two parties will be pardoned. It is a new attempt to pacify the country, an objective that is shared by the majority of the populace. The outcome of this procedure in the long run is arguable and part of the actual debate.

### 3. Some opinions about coups.

A coup is actually a very functional tool to overthrow a government, and the military organization itself is an ideal body or structure to control such a process in its first steps. Our recent history tells us that politicians of the opposition, in the best case, neither act for nor oppose the upheaval. Most of the time they encourage it as a means to participate in power when democratic procedures have failed them. At worst, which has been no exception, when a government is doing badly in their perception, or in relation to their interests, citizens (particularly the ones better educated) wonder and ask themselves (or others, military included) what the military is doing, or why the government is not overthrown?

It has never been the case that one day a general decides to take over; instead, a sort of consensus develops among the entourage, made of middle class and well-educated people, to encourage the coup. The military leaders, inspired in general by patriotic duty and with a certain dose of arrogance, find themselves the salvation of the country, with a destiny to accomplish a unique mission: rescue their land from an undeserved destiny; in other words, to be able to reach the outstanding future that the country rightly deserves!

It is not seen, or it is later forgotten, that this procedure was a means to hide the failure of different democratic governments. By taking over, the causes that led to the coups are inherited as problems to be solved by the military government. It relieves the former politicians in office from having to explain why their program had failed; they become a kind of martyr of the military. As a consequence, their failures do not show up and they do not pay a political price.

The military is not prepared to rule a country. It is understandable to include specialists or advisors in the military government to improve the decision process. Those agents are recruited among civilians or politicians who have knowledge and/or experience. As a result, negotiation, so natural in political life but so alien to the military mind, is to be implemented. No more distinct differentiation of black and white of the military initial perception; the gray of the political arena begins to direct the process, and the original objectives of clearing the way with a straightforward procedure fails. In addition, a type of legitimacy complex drives the military to try to give constitutional support to their administration. The paradox is that the military had violated this fundamental constitutional law in taking over the government.

If interrupted, the learning process exercised in a democracy cannot provide any more feedback, and there is no way



to improve or develop the system. Nobody learns: neither the politicians, nor the citizens, nor the military; everything stay the same.

A bright Argentine statesman, Juan Bautista Alberdi, said at the end of the last century that "countries have the governments that they deserve." I cannot imagine a better conclusion applicable to any society that so dramatically fits in Argentine contemporary political history.

#### 4. Ideas about new politico-military relations in Argentina.

After past experiences, we the military have acquired a very low profile among extensive sectors of the Argentine populace (Carballo de Cilley, 1987, p.69), which I extend also to the general external opinion. I hope that this circumstance motivates us to recreate a new approach in politico-military relations, not as a way to give up our convictions, but to rethink our philosophies and allow them to be in the best interest of the nation. I think that the recent experience, added to the ones of the last decades, is a useful tool to learn and modify this sort of "moderating pattern" Argentine style, and any other more permanent will of the military to supervise a legitimate government.

Neither "subjective control" nor "objective" has been a solution for Argentina: the former was clearly a universal failure, the latter a dubious solution for any country, because it is a fiction, it does not exist as explained before (Chapter I, point 2). The real solution must be something in between, finding the right place for the military but also the right one for the politician. A more mature relation based on mutual confidence and respect, in my view, is the key point. The only way to get it is for the soldier and politician to know each other better, to learn from one another.

Integration looks to be the only civilized way to solve the problem. In fact, to understand both perspectives at the same time looks to be difficult, but is rewarding. In that sense, the military at the top level should learn to negotiate, to accept a different view as much as civilians must recognize the role the military has to play in the political arena, not within the government, but advising the government with military perspective and a political insight.

Remember: war (external or internal) is a political issue, but both the military and the politician have roles to play; we had better get together beforehand.

As a way to effect the integration, politicians should exercise "participatory control," which means to allow the

military to intervene in policy decision making. Of course, politicization should be an institutional effort, not related to any political party in particular but to all in general. Political theory should be studied to know where the military problem must be addressed. It should be overt and neutral. Not all levels would be involved, but the higher ranks and the prospective flag officers must be educated in that sense. Probably postgraduate education in universities is the best way to interact because it is an academic environment that allows opinions to be confronted. War colleges should be open to civilians to a certain extent to encourage interaction during regular courses.

The theory of civil-military relations must be taught, not only in the War Colleges of the services but also in universities, to foster mutual understanding.

Political science should not be a dirty word for the military. Since violence is still a universal reality, politicians must know about violence or military problems. They cannot ignore them.

The only way to control violence is within the state. The military, institutional specialists of that violence, is the executioner of governmental decisions, not an independent body, isolated or marginal, that only on certain occasions, can be

functional to the government. The military is legitimately entitled to participate in the decision process. In fact, participation, one of the pillars of democracy, is the solid argument for the need of the higher ranks of the military to be able to influence with their arguments in such process. Their opinions must be added to others and the resultant decision should be the one for which the legitimate government chooses to be accountable.

I do not agree with Huntington that participation of military in policy making is "the most subtle and most persuasive form which liberal antimilitarism could assume." (Huntington, 1957, p.352)

I adhere to a fusionist theory of civil-military relations and I think participation is the right place for the military of any country today and in the future.

Despite the complexity of the modern world and the need for specialization, the higher ranks of the military must be provided with certain necessary political skills in addition to their technical knowledge in warfare.

Again, the proposal to have an input of political theory in the military mind is not for better preparation for a coup, but on the contrary is a way to understand the good reasons to avoid

it. With respect to results, I suspect that most of the participants in past coups, if sincere, would agree that, in retrospect, almost all the coups were not justified.

Coming back to McKinlay's definition of politicization, it

"...is the process involving either the calculation of values and opinions of the expression of action towards the polity based on such values, which lies OUTSIDE the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of competence of any organization." (Van Gils, 1971, p.255)

If politicization of the military is related to values that lie OUTSIDE the functional sphere of competence, I believe strongly that the military should know quite well the political aspects that lie WITHIN this sphere, which are not a few. The super-question then is how can we separate them in the real world? The simple answer is by building a common language between the statesman and the soldier as a way to interface with a mutual base of confidence and respect, just to communicate.

It is naive to try to isolate soldiers from politics:

"The military are not hired "mercenaries." They cannot be arbitrarily deprived of participation in community and public affairs. Thus, the vitality of the military profession depends on a delicate balance between a special sense of inner group loyalty and participation in the larger society." (Janowitz, 1973, p.28)

If the high-ranking military personnel lack political knowledge, their perception will be that all conflicts must be met with force as the main solution. An aggressive posture of the military towards defense is not best for the country's security in all cases.

Political knowledge and participation is not evil in itself; what looks to be evil, at least in our case, is the premise that the military must be "supervising" or "moderating" the government to ensure the best national interest. That is not under discussion. The politicians in office, the government, have the burden or the responsibility of the whole country on their shoulders. It was not given by chance to them, but after a compromise of wills among people of the whole society and expressed by means of voting. Human imperfection has not yet found a better way to do it.

Economy and war are part of the political problem, but we cannot invert terms and englobe the whole, through the limited scope of a narrower perspective. On the other hand, politicians also have to learn, as Admiral Eccles wrote,

"As military analysts, we should try to establish a common theoretical structure for the study of these problems for only then will we be able readily to relate the events of one crisis to those of other crises. Only then will we be able to show patterns of action and behavior that can contribute to the education of civilians before they acquire power over military affairs." (Eccles, Notes, 23 January 1970)

So the need is twofold, and the civilians must learn at our side and we the military must learn at their side.

Defenders of "objective control" would disagree that a formal "politicization from within" is the way to avoid an informal or weak "politicization from without," which would distort the environment and preclude mutual understanding.

The government must exercise a "participatory control," which means to allow the military to intervene in the decision process of related matters, while reserving the right to decide and run the risk to be accountable for their own perception of the better course of action<sup>7</sup>.

5. Summary.

The foundation of the Argentine Army is intermingled with the birth of the nation state. In general, the armed forces contributed to the formation of the nation by participating in political issues.

The six main coups, beginning with the one in 1930, have their root in a lack of statemanship of Argentine politicians;

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<sup>7</sup>See the analysis of the Cuban missile crisis in Chapter III point 1-d p.65.

these takeovers failed simply because the military was not skillful in political matters. The basic cause of their failure was the bad political culture of the Argentine society; it must be changed.

The "moderating pattern" does not fit in the recent Argentine past, due to the idea of accomplishing objectives and not deadlines. In the fabric of Argentine society, the scars of the "dirty war" will probably last several generations; misunderstanding of political and military aspects of this war as a whole was the main cause of the original wounds. The outcome of the Malvinas/Falkland war, based on an Argentine political mistake, produced the collapse of the military government and a new possibility for democracy. The Alfonsin administration failed to understand the military; he over controlled them. The "planteos," along with "La Tablada" experience, put an end to a virtual recognition of the internal role of the military in such eventualities. The new President Menem is creating conditions for a better understanding. Military men are now convinced, in general, that they must continue to be rid of new coups. Participatory control looks to be the way to incorporate the military in the democratic process. Civil military relations can and must be improved through better communications between the two social groups.



## CHAPTER III

### UNITED STATES CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

#### 1. Background.

Huntington, in chapter six of his classic book, describes what he considers the ideological constant in American political arena: the liberal society against the military professionalism. He supports this statement with several episodes, two of which can serve as examples: (1) the dismantling of the American Army 6 months after the end of the Revolution (1784) and (2) the reaction of President Woodrow Wilson when, in 1915, he found out by reading the "Baltimore Sun" that the General Staff was preparing plans for the eventuality of war with Germany.

During those 131 years, a similar pattern of "liberalism" was in practice. In 1784, the Continental Congress agreed that

"Standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of the free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." (Huntington, 1957, p.144)

In 1915, the President directed the Acting Secretary of War, Henry Breckinridge, to investigate, and, if he found that war preparations were being made to relieve every officer on the General Staff and order him out of Washington.

"These incidents together illustrate two basic points concerning the American political mind. First, liberalism dominated American thinking from the Revolution through the first half of the twentieth century. Second, liberalism does not understand and is hostile to military institutions and the military function." (Huntington, 1957, p.144)

There were two exceptions to the manifestation of conservative forces, as Huntington saw it. The first exception was the Federalists of New England, who were challenged internally because of their wealth and externally because of the European threat. Because the nation had recently been born, the Federalists feared an internal, French style of revolution and extremely the British fleet. The second exception was the Southern conservatism, which was an island in a liberal society. After 1865, in the defeated south, liberalism reigned unchallenged on the American scene. (Huntington, 1957, p.147)

In addition to other relatively minor differences between liberals and conservatives, some exceptions involving the military could probably be counted during this period. In fact, the Mexican War, the Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War can hardly be considered as expressions of liberal ideology.

Despite the fact that the Constitution of the United States does not provide for civilian control, the framers of the constitution in their speeches and writings supported the belief that the military should be subordinated to the civil power.

"The Framers' concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force, rather to control the military themselves.... the Framers identified civilian control with the fragmentation of authority over military." (Huntington, 1957, p.168)

"The separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflict, which has been a major hinderance to the development of military professionalism and civilian control in the United States." (Huntington, 1957, p.177)

In my view, this political conflict must be solved through a compromise in which the highest ranking military should be active participants.

"The ethical guidelines enshrined in the Constitution constitute a system of shared power generally known as checks and balances. Our political heritage is based on the philosophy that power is enhanced and the danger of uncontrolled power mitigated by diffusion among a number of centers of initiative. It rests on the need for popular participation in decision making and it looks forward to the prospect of creative conflict among the competing factions, interests and opinions that are inevitable in society." (Schartz and Winters, NWCR Sep/Oct, 1979)

Since the publication of "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" (1890) by Alfred T. Mahan, a school of thought identified as Neo-Hamiltonian has strongly influenced American politics, both internal and external. It was the first important group

"...whose political philosophy more or less consciously borrowed and incorporated elements of the professional military ethic." (Huntington, 1957, p.270)

of liberal-conservative values. They saw the permanent possibility of conflict and the policy of power as the best way to guarantee national security.

"They shared with the military a stress on loyalty, duty, responsibility and subordination of the self to the requirements of the nation." (Huntington, 1957, p.272)

It was the end of a period of certain isolationism; American involvement in world politics was intensified. As a related fact (cause or effect?), the military participated much more in politics during the period, under "subjective control."

Mahan in his book stressed the importance that naval officers should also become statesmen:

" 'Aim to be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen' he advised naval officers, stressing the desirability of political knowledge and political action." (Huntington, 1957, p.277)

The involvement in World War I enhanced the participation of the military in politics.

a. Inter-War Period. After World War I, a new wave of antimilitarism developed, despite military efforts to maintain identification with the American society. The National Defense Act of 1920 was the main attempt to inaugurate a new age of civil-military relations and to keep in place the Neo-Hamiltonian

perspective. In order to reach this goal, it was stated, "We must get on our feet at once and adopt business methods to meet business conditions," in marked contrast to the prewar military distaste for anything suggestive of business and commercialism.<sup>8</sup> This new approach was formally recognized by the recision of President Wilson's order banning public discussion of national policy by officers, and by the issuance in 1927 of a new Army regulation declaring that public defense and advocacy of the national military policies was "naturally and logically one of the important duties of the officers of the Army." (Huntington, 1957, p.284)

The fundamental values of the American military profession did not change significantly between the wars. The unfavorable view of human nature, the lessons to be learned from history<sup>9</sup>, the permanence of war and conflict, and the necessity for order and subordination, all continued; the only change was the stress on loyalty as the basic value. The necessity of initiative based in loyalty was recognized, as much as war becomes more sophisticated and the organization itself gets more complicated. If diplomacy fails to solve a conflict, then war would be the only recourse. To delay war is necessary in an adequate balance of power.

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<sup>8</sup>See last point of the chapter related to liberal-military struggle.

<sup>9</sup>See last point of the chapter related to liberal-military struggle.

"The progressive involvement of the United States in international politics by the 30's caused the world of American foreign relations, to approximate the image which the military had always painted." (Huntington, 1957, p.307)

In relation to government, the military interpretation of Clausewitz still was valid: armed forces are the "instrument" of the government and national policy dictates military policy. But "it was the duty of the statesman to formulate a clear, concise, and unambiguous declaration of national policy to guide the military." This concept was based in the idea of a clear distinction between politics and military affairs.

" 'Policy and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart' said a Command and General Staff School publication in 1936." (Huntington, 1957, p.309)

However, this simple expression of labor division did not fit into the global concept of war in modern times (if it ever did), where all the factors are intermingled. In general, U.S. military at that time complained about education, which they saw as being seized by

"...the philosophy of 'scholastic liberalism' which emphasized only scientific analysis and research and which rejected the old faiths and ideals. . . . Deprived of moral values, the college freshman 'plunges desperately into a godless philosophy, <sup>10</sup> . . . ' " (Huntington, 1957, p.311)

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<sup>10</sup>See last point of the chapter related to liberal-military struggle.

b. Second World War. World War II began a new era in civil-military relations in the U.S. In Huntington's view, the following were key aspects:

(1) As far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the military ran the war.

(2) In this era of policy and strategy, the military ran the war just the way the American people and American statesman wanted it run.

(3) On the domestic front, control over economic mobilization was shared between military and civilians agencies.

The military leaders reached unprecedented heights in World War II. General McArthur was the paradigm of the blend of military hero during the war and successful statesman in the reconstruction of Japan. But it can be said that these leaders scaled the summits only by sacrificing their military outlook and accepting the national values. At that time, the American people and the American statesmen adhered to Ludendorff's philosophy: the peace for the statesman, the war for the military. When war was over, peacetime tension between military imperatives and American liberal society arose again.

The National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were established in 1947, formalizing the participation of the military in crisis decisions. However, the struggle continued between the military with increased power and a society with liberal values.

Nevertheless, the influence of the military at that time was unprecedented. Three of the more significant manifestations of their influence were:

"(1) the influx of military officers into governmental positions normally occupied by civilians; (2) the close ties which developed between military leaders and business leadership; and (3) the widespread popularity and prestige of individual military figures." (Huntington, 1957, p.354)

In addition, during the postwar decade a new phenomenon arose: the rapprochement of the military to the business elite.

"Retired generals and admirals in unprecedented numbers moved into the executive staffs of American corporations; new organizations arose bridging the gap between corporate management and military leadership." (Huntington, 1957, p.362)

This apparent contradiction, of the business liberalism, can be explained because the corporations accepted the officers and utilized their talents and reputations, but they did not accept the professional military viewpoint; the military surrendered their military outlook (Huntington, 1957, p.364). The two foremost military leaders that emerged after the war, Douglas



McArthur and Dwight Eisenhower, both lost their "professionalism" with their involvement in politics. McArthur later became the abolitionist of all wars and the Eisenhower the instrument of the reduction of the American military strength.

Eisenhower warned in his presidential Farewell Address that the "military-industrial complex" must be carefully watched lest it take over the leadership of the nation. The natural link of the corporations to the military was (and still is) the defense industry, bolstered by the Cold War. This is an important point to be studied, but it is not within the scope of this paper.

c. Korea. The Korean War was the first conflict in American history to include the existence of the atomic bomb from the beginning to end. With troops not well prepared and a loose political policy, the relationship between General McArthur as theatre commander and President Truman would be severely tested: a real test between the civilian authority of the President and the tradition of giving the field commander a great deal of autonomy.

General McArthur believed, as Ludendorff did, that after other political means controlled by the civilians failed, and force is applied, then that is the time of the military. He also had a peculiar but not uncommon interpretation of loyalty:

"I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of the government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous." (Previdi, 1986, p.63)

It sounds familiar to me, because it is the frequent argument that was supported by the heads of repeated coups in Argentina and fits in Stepan's "moderating pattern." In the name of the Constitution, the most varied actions had been taken. I do not agree with McArthur's view, but at least he rebelled against the President without taking over the government.

After the brilliant Inchon amphibious landing and when Seoul was recaptured by the Chinese, General McArthur complained publicly of being hampered by President Truman's refusal to allow the bombing of supply depots in China. That was too much for Truman, who fired McArthur (Schlesinger, 1986, p.507).

A lack of understanding among polity and theater commanders obviously is a source of problems; any clear distinction, a la Ludendorff, between war and peace or military and political insights is unnatural and dissociate means from ends.

d. Cuban Missile Crisis. After the Bay of Pigs crisis, President Kennedy, unimpressed by advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically cautioned the Chiefs against limiting their

counsel to "purely military considerations," a directive reiterated by each of his successors (Schratz and Winters, NWCR Sep/Oct, 1979, p.106).

During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the development of the blockade idea:

"The members of the Joint Chiefs were unanimous in calling for immediate military action. They forcefully presented their view that blockade would not be effective. General Curtis LeMay, then Air Force Chief of Staff, argued strongly with the President that military attack was essential. When the President questioned what the response of the Russians might be, General LeMay assured him there would be no reaction." (Brodie, 1973, p.487)

The author also makes clear not only that the military were willing to attack, but also that civilians such as former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and some others agreed.

On Saturday, October 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an air strike and consequent invasion. The information that a J-2 pilot had been shot down and killed exerted great pressure for making an attack. However, the President pulled back and decided to wait.

"The next day the crisis was ended. Khrushchev had agreed to remove the missiles. The American military had responded impressively in their preparations and in their military conduct, but the recommendations of their leaders had left the President profoundly disturbed." (Brodie, 1973, p.488)

"On that fateful Sunday morning when the Russians answered they were withdrawing their missiles, it was suggested by one high military adviser that we attack Monday in any case. Another felt that we had in some way been betrayed." (Brodie, 1973, p.489)

President Kennedy had been heavily affected by the total failure of the invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs, which influenced him strongly in moderating his decisions in the missile crisis. I would venture to say that the involved military were also influenced by this past experience; despite the presidential directive to consider not only military factors, they were single-minded in favoring the use of military force.

"President Kennedy always had to keep in mind the fact that if something really went wrong and war broke out with the Soviet Union, then indeed it could mean the end not only for them but for us as well. Unlike the past, no mistakes could be made. Military strategy and policy were synonyms." (Previdi, 1986, p.79)

Some years before that, Henry Kissinger had said in that regard:

"A separation of strategy and policy can be achieved only to the detriment of both. It causes military power to be identified with the most absolute applications of power and it tempts diplomacy into an overconcern with finesse. Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as 'purely' military advice." (Kissinger, 1957, p.422)

Regarding single-minded thinking, Bernard Brodie complains about:

"The military officer's extreme dedication to the idea of winning, to the notion of victory for its own sake, as distinct from such questions as what is sought through victory or whether it will be worth the price paid for it tactically or strategically." (Brodie, 1973, p.491)

One of the central ideas of Clausewitz, his concern about the fundamental nature of war as a branch of politics, was immortalized in his repeated and misunderstood phrase. The dean of the American civilian strategists had stated:

"The usual conception, prevailing today almost as much as formerly, stops far short of that understanding. It (the military) is preoccupied almost exclusively with the winning of wars, as though the latter were conceived to be something comparable to athletic contest with, to be sure, an added ingredient of seriousness. The general has indeed been trained or conditioned to want desperately to win, and to be willing to pay any price possible to do so....However, there also has to be at the top, certainly in the civilian and preferably also in the military department of the government, the basic and prevailing conception of what any war existing or impending is really about and what it is attempting to accomplish. This attitude includes necessarily a readiness to reexamine whether under the circumstances existing it is right to continue it or whether it is better to seek some other solution or termination other than victory, even if victory in the strictly military sense is judged attainable." (Brodie, 1973, pp.438/39)

It is curious that Eccles also considered the concept of victory as a key element in that struggle:

"I believe it useful to examine the concept of victory because in this lies the source of some of the great differences of opinion" (Eccles, Notes, September 17, 1979).

It seems natural that generals or admirals pursue victory as the paradigm, but again, as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis teaches us, purely military considerations from military advisers can be extremely dangerous and not always the best course of action. As Admiral Eccles put it, victory should be revisited by the military.

e. Vietnam. In what began as a consequence of World War II and moved along in a large chronology, the United States became increasingly involved in what Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles named "The Vietnam Hurricane." Under risk of omission, the author considered five aspects as the main points to discuss:

"A. The faulty draft law, and how its operation combined with the guns and butter policy of President Johnson to undermine the control of the internal field of action, i.e., the sources of our power.

B. The excessive degree of control exercised by the Secretary of Defense and the President over the tactical operation of our combat forces.

C. The gross failure of our high command, both civilian and military, to understand how logistic system behaves under the stress of combat with the consequent growth of the logistic snowball.

D. The lack of integrity of command in the civilian leadership by its unwise and dishonest attempts to conceal the true cost of the war, and the loss of integrity among many military commanders.

E. Finally, and perhaps most important, the inability or reluctance to take decisive action coupled with the failure to appreciate and compensate for the effects of this indecisiveness." (Eccles, 1979, p.xii)

One of Eccles conclusions is that, particularly after 1964, the course of action adopted was always a compromise and, as such, an indecisive action.

"A free society survives in accordance with the ability of its political process to resolve the clash of the vested interests that are inherent in any large organized group. This resolution is usually in the form of compromise. Thus the habit of compromise is deeply ingrained. In military affairs, compromise also must take place but with a great difference. Compromise in operational planning entails a risk that is quite different both in nature and value from the risks of political compromise. Frequently it leads to great disaster. It is better to abandon or not undertake a military commitment rather than accept a fundamental compromise." (Eccles, 1979, p.xiv)

The difference here is clear between the political and military approach to operations, or, in other words, the distinction between ideas and facts. Ideas are abstract and compromise is reachable; facts are concrete and compromise has physical constraints. Misunderstanding the environment can be disastrous; trying to solve military problems with only political procedures is as bad as trying to solve political problems with just military ones.

The absence of a clear political objective for the war and weak politico-military relations seem to be the key points of failure.

"Most important of all was the basic lack of conceptual unity between the civilian and military leaders on the philosophy of 'controlled response' as opposed to decisive action, either positive or negative. All too frequently there was a plausible reason for halfway measures and compromise." (Eccles, 1979, p.130)

Although the rights and wrongs of Vietnam will long be debated, the different concepts of compromise between polity and military minds seem to be a key aspect to be considered. The wrong approach to military aspects by politicians was added to a lack of political concern by top military leaders. This combination led to micromanagement of tactical forces by civilians and disregard for political accountability by the military. Rationality, or the relation of means to the end was broken by weak civil-military relations.

## 2. The recent past.

The period from 1940 to 1970 included not only expansion of the military force in the United States, but also the civilianization of the military. The dependence of the military on civilian science and industry weakened the boundaries between the military and the civilian society.

"The task of socio-political control during this period was to prevent excessive politization of the military and to contain its influence which derived from its size and importance." (Janowitz, 1973, p.27)

The peak of this trend of civilianization probably reached its limit even before the end of the draft, when the all-volunteer system was initiated. The military recovered more



clear-cut boundaries amid the dangers of social isolation and political peculiarities. Direct channels of interaction between the military and polity were lost.

Franklin D. Roosevelt was the last President to make a sharp division between the need to control overall political/strategic policy while having operations delegated to the military. Modern technology and associated destructive power of both sides (Soviets and Americans) to field forces, modified the equation and made it necessary to move closer oversee Theater Commanders. As Previdi said:

"Nuclear power, other military weapons, and rapid communications have forced each succeeding President, since Roosevelt, to more thoroughly control military strategy and implementation." (Previdi, 1986, p.38)

The 1973 War Powers Resolution Act reasserted greater congressional control over the military.

a. Lebanon. The Reagan Administration from 1981 to 1984 made diplomatic and military efforts to increase the chances of an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the Middle East, only to find by early 1984 that the U.S. had totally lost any capability to influence events in Lebanon.

In an article published in the Naval War College Review, Ambassador Marshall Bremont discussed the impact experienced by

the audience during a lecture of Brigadier General James M. Mead at the Naval War College about commanding forces in Lebanon:

"The message conveyed by General Mead was the kind of amorphous and nebulous situation he encountered in Lebanon that required the employment of Marines in ways which they had not been trained and for which no specific doctrine existed. Nevertheless, it was a situation that Marines will be dealing with again and again in the years ahead. It therefore behooves us - both civilians and military - to think through what we will be facing us in such situations so that we do not find ourselves coping constantly with the totally unexpected." (Bremont, 1988, Winter, NWCR, p.27)

In the same article, the author stated that the same conclusion was reached by the Strategic Study Group this year, which concluded that "a dysfunction existed between civilian and military thinking" in trying to fit their wartime plans into peacetime contingencies.

Conflict in modern times is extremely complex. Each successive conflict involves more intervening factors and, whereas only some of them are specifically military, most are not. We can say again with different words that a better integration of politico-military thinking is a must to solve problems in which the two perspectives are over imposed. That will be the case in the future as it probably always was.

b. Department of Defense reorganization. The still vivid experience of Vietnam, added to the failure of Lebanon and some lessons about jointness learned in Grenada, ended in a substantial reorganization of the Department of Defense.

In a press release dated September 11, 1986, from the Committee on Armed Services, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) declared that they had completed their work on:

"...the most far-reaching reorganization of the United States defense establishment in almost 30 years. The legislation approved by the conferences today continues the work begun by President Truman immediately after World War II and carried on by President Eisenhower in the 1950's. Like the efforts of those two Presidents, this bill seeks to overcome the weak inter-Service cooperation that has hampered our military operations from the Spanish American War to the operation in Grenada."

The Goldwater-Nichols Act became law on October 1, 1986. It enhanced the power of the Secretary of Defense, particularly the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, it created a Vice-Chairman who was senior to the Services's Chiefs and enhanced the command and personnel authority of the unified and specified commanders. The joint functions were revised.

Some voices raised the issue that "civilian control" of the military was threatened by this law. They believed that law placed in jeopardy the wise point of the Constitution giving the operational control of the military to the executive branch, and control of the money to the Congress.

"What the Goldwater-Nichols Act can do is change the struggle for control of the military from one civilian branch of government versus another to a struggle between two civilian branches of

government, the executive branch and Congress, versus the military establishment." (Previdi, 1986, p.37)

John F. Lehman, Jr., former Secretary of the Navy, believed that these reforms severely diluted the principle of civilian control of the military:

"In 1988 under congressional pressure, the Secretary of Defense agreed to give the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff primary responsibility for selecting admirals and generals for promotion to three- and four-star rank in all the services. Civilian control has now effectively been brought to an end. All military officers must now obey and please the unelected chairman, for he alone - or more accurately, his staff - controls their fate. The sole exception is the slender thread of one soul, the Secretary of Defense." (Lehman, 1988, p.423)

The initial general skepticism about the "new thinking" in the Soviet Union has changed significantly. This new perspective, added to the arms control agreements and fiscal deficit, has convinced Congress to cut the U.S. defense budget to a certain extent. The purse, once again, is a tool to control the power of the military when the occasion seems to be favorable. As this cut is taking place, former Secretary Lehman will be less likely to fear that the civilians have lost control of the military in the United States.

c. Case of General Woener. In 1988, I was greatly impressed by General Fred P. Woener, who displayed his knowledge of Latin America during a lecture at the Naval War College about the Southern Command. He demonstrated a very accurate insight into

the problems of the region; he seemed to have definite ideas as to the policies to be applied and was willing to help reach solutions. Unfortunately, his public declarations concerning a lack of definitive policy towards the region were not backed up by policy from the Bush administration. Some months later, after some debate, he was forced to retire.

The following idea was later published in the Naval War College Review:

"The military professional in a democratic society has significant moral obligation to participate in the debate on public policy in order to sharpen the discussion by adding a perspective of informed opinion and experience...."

After giving solid military ethical reasons for participation of the military in the political debate, the article stated that one of the avenues to argument of defense policy should be:

"...writing and speaking in civilian as well as military fora on foreign policy. A few words on each of these strategies may suggest opportunities for influencing the public debate as well as drawing attention to some of the career risks involved in exercising the professional responsibility proposed herein. Dissent after all, has a unique role in American tradition that outsiders often find difficult to understand." (Schratz and Winters, 1979, September/October NWCR)

In my view, this comment exactly fits the case of General Woener, which, despite the fact that I am an outsider, I understand quite well.

The personal career of General Woener, his intentions to help the region, but most importantly the chance to hear a possible sound policy towards Latin America, were all hampered by his political mistake in stating his opinion. This incident demonstrates a clear need for high-ranking military officers to develop complete political skills, enabling them to avoid those mistakes or at least to make them aware that they should consider using more receptive channels to express their opinions. Although I do not know all the details of the episode in question, it seems to be an example of civilian "over-control."

d. Internal intervention. A few months ago, I witnessed the promotion ceremony of a Marine officer who became Commander. As a significant part of it, the officer pronounced an oath:

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter; so help me God."

From that I concluded that both internal and external environments are possible fields in which the U.S. military can fight the enemies of the United States. As military internal intervention in Argentina had been a concurrent issue, some

comparisons with similar events in the United States can be made. The following examples of internal intervention of the armed forces in the United States come to mind:

(1) On October 2, 1962, President Kennedy sent 3,000 Army troops to Mississippi to control riots of whites complaining about allowing a Negro to attend a white university (The New York Times, p.1).

(2) On April 6, 1968, President Johnson ordered 4,000 regular Army and National Guard troops into the nation's capital to try to end riotous looting, burglarizing, and burning by roving bands of Negro youths. The order was given because "a condition of domestic violence and disorder existed." (The New York Times, p.1)

(3) On September 22, 1989, hurricane "Hugo" not only produced much damage but also created such disruptive social effects in the Virgin Islands that President Bush gave the order: "Members of the armed forces of the United States will be used to suppress the violence in the Virgin Islands that erupted after a complete breakdown of civil authority." (The New York Times, p.1)

These few examples are an indication that armed forces have a clear role in counteracting internal violence in a democracy

when the scale is such that the regular police forces are overwhelmed. Civilian control over the military is not necessarily lost in this case, but is in fact another example of exercising that control.

### 3. Summary.

In Huntington's view, liberal society against military professionalism is a constant factor in the U.S. political arena. Since the independence era, civilian control of the military has been of great concern in this country. Alfred Tyler Mahan maintained that naval officers must be not only seamen but also statesmen. The Mahan era coincides with more involvement of the United States in world affairs. After World War I, the National Defense Act was an attempt to maintain the involvement of military in national policy discussions. However, Clausewitz was misunderstood at that time and a clear distinction between politics and military affairs existed. The Second World War brought in a new era in civil military relations where the military leaders reached unprecedented heights. At that time, statesmen and the U.S. people adhered to Ludendorff's philosophy: the peace for the statesman, the war for the military. In 1947, the participation of the military in crisis decisions was formalized. It seems clear that a simple division of labor, such as policy to the government and management of violence to the



military, is not enough; a real interaction in the decision process is necessary. The President must make the ultimate decisions, but with the help of well informed military advisors. In other words, politicians must be acquainted with military matters and the military with political ones: each must be able to speak the same language as the only way to communicate with each other. Both ends and the means must be consistent with only one "rationality", which cannot be only political or only military: it must include other ingredients such as economics and religion at the same time. This is the political struggle.

## CHAPTER IV

### UNITED STATES/ARGENTINA MILITARY INTERACTION

#### 1. Some differences and similarities

Despite the fact that the 1853 Argentine Constitution is almost a copy of the United States one, the political cultures of the two societies are very different. The scale, power, magnitude, and commitments of the armed forces are obviously not comparable.

The issue of internal intervention is also clearly different. A tradition in Argentina of involvement in coups d'etat during almost the whole existence of the country is in sharp contrast to no case of military takeover in the United States. Argentina has kept the draft as an obligation of citizenship, and the United States currently has all volunteer armed forces.

The reserves are organized quite differently. The U.S. has a strong system that allows it to maintain a high readiness level in case of mobilization. The periodic tours in active duty not only accomplish the goal of keeping the personnel skilled, but

also provide an ideal interface between the civilian and military activities of the reserves.

In Argentina, there is practically only one source of officer recruitment: through the three academies, one for each service. In the U.S., there are several other sources in addition to the four service academies.

Postgraduate studies are very common among the U.S. officers. Most senior officers with the prospect of becoming Admirals have earned a masters degree. In Argentina in 1983, the Naval War College established a solid link with a private university to provide postgraduate education to some volunteer officers. Since 1987 a regular course at the Naval War College has been made compulsory in order to earn a masters degree in International Relations. Fortunately, the other services are now following the Navy's lead.

Almost half of the military personnel in the U.S. armed forces have had assignments abroad, whereas in the case of Argentina it is a very small percentage.

Admiral Eccles saw a main difference among Hispanic and U.S. American military:

"In the hispanic tradition, the military sees itself as the guardian of the morals of the government and hence feels obligated to assume political power when political ineptitude and corruption become excessive. The American tradition is quite different; the military has sworn to defend the constitution, not the morals of the state. It can however, set an example of competence, dedication, and integrity. Furthermore, the military can ever be the core of an overall system of national service that can provide a sense of social responsibility." (Eccles, 1979, p.15)

Nevertheless, involvement in the foreign policy debate is a significant part of the military thinking of both countries. The "military mind" and values promoted in the services are basically similar. Concern about the dangers of communism is a common factor among the majority of military men of both countries. In addition, the struggle for power among both sectors of society civilians and military are rather similar.

## 2. Argentine-United States military relations.

As pointed out before, separation among political or military at the top of the ladder or the national political decision making environment, is impossible. Some indications imply that military relations between Argentina and the United States, in general terms, have been better than the relation between governments of both countries.

Since the late 1930's, the United States and Latin American countries have been linked in a military alliance called the

Inter-American Military System (IAMS). Several periods of growth and decline were the expression of a unique set of politico-military factors that have directed the U.S.-Latin America relationship over the years. Jack Child identifies four periods (Child, 1980, p.1):

- Creation and growth in World War II.
- Divergence and decline in the early Cold War years (1945- 1961).
- Expansion and rebirth during the guerrilla period of the 1960's.
- Fragmentation and dysfunction in the contemporary years.

Argentina has always kept an obstructionist stance and followed the general patterns of these four periods.

During World War II, in contrast to other Latin American countries, there was a lack of relationship between the U.S. and Argentina. During the 1940 Military Staff Conference, the Argentine presence was polite but cool and reflected

"...the peculiar and distinctively Argentine mixture of national pride and disdain for cooperation with the United States." (Child, 1980, p.59, quoting Conil Paz, "Argentina's Foreign Policy" pp 77-78)

Some constraints of weapons supply from Europe in late 1941 led the Argentine democratic government to put pride aside and

send a military delegation to Washington to discuss arms Lend-Lease. Although relations improved, the Pearl Harbour attack delayed the agreement, with a condition being imposed that arms supply would be contingent on close cooperation with the United States.

"Rebuffed by the United States, fearful of German retaliation and indignant to the attempt to use Lend Lease as coercion, Argentina turned secretly to Germany for arms in 1942 and 1943." (Child, 1980, p.60)

Argentina needed to rearm, and the Argentine Army had a German orientation at that time. The reaction of the United States was to reinforce the supply of arms to Brazil (a more cooperative and strategically located ally) as a way to impress on Argentina and their neighbors the importance of this action. The highly nationalistic regime of Juan Peron served to consolidate the U.S./Brazilian bilateral relationship.

After 1941, in the early stages of a permanent military foundation, the State Department and the War and Navy Departments were in a permanent struggle to give preference to multilateral or bilateral relations. In 1947, delayed almost two years because of the Argentine stance, the result was a compromise

"...by which the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) would be only an advisory body with no authority or command function; the military services would be free to continue their bilateral relationship." (Child, 1980, p.37)

So it was (and still is) more a political than a military forum that works as a bilateral interface of military issues between the U.S. and some Latin American countries. However, there should be no confusion about which political aspects can be discussed, namely only those related to "military policy" levels, and not to national policies.

During the 1945-1947 period, the posture of the U.S. military was in favor of normalizing relations with Argentina as a way to get a cooperative consensus in the expected Rio conference. The State Department was the hard-liner against Argentina.

In the Inter-American Military System we can see an "unequal alliance," as Jack Child said, with a member with more power than the rest combined.

"The Latin view of the United States is ambivalent: she is seen both as protector against outside threat and as menace in her own right. For this reason, there has always been a reluctance on the Latin side to any move which would make the 'Organization of American States' more like NATO: such a "militarization" would place powerful legal instrument for intervention at the disposal of the United States. As a past OAS Secretary General (Alberto Lleras Camargo) put it: "Our organization could perhaps become a military alliance of nations bound together by common strategic motives, but it would then lose its present high juridical and moral value." (Child, 1980, p.99)

The posture of the U.S. military preparing the Inter-American Conference in Bogota (1948) conflicted with the State

In 1961, the threat of the Cuban supported "focos"<sup>11</sup> gave the United States a renewed but brief period of priority towards Latin America. The linkage with the "Alliance for Progress" gave a trend to the military that went beyond purely military functions. This new communist subversive threat was seen as more economical, social, or political than military. The forces were involved in "civic action" or "nation building" concepts. The idea of Hemisphere Defense was seen as unrealistic.

The Bay of Pigs operation (April 1961), alien to the IAMS, eroded the U.S. image by showing the tendency of the U.S. to perform unilateral action.

During the 1960's, the U.S. sponsored "Doctrine of National Security and Development," was the ideological framework that shaped a new model of civil-military relations in Latin America, with a local interpretation in each country. Its origin can be seen in the involvement of local military in the "anti-focos" strategy linked to the broader policy of the Alliance for Progress promoted by the Kennedy administration.

In Argentina this doctrine was the blend of traditional geopolitical ideology that stressed the overall objective of "growth" and the "well being of the people," based in national

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<sup>11</sup> This theory was supported by Fidel Castro, as a way to spread communism in Latin America by means of nuclei of guerrilla warfare to foster the revolution.



security, military power, development, and sovereignty. This concept is surprisingly in accordance with the newly learned "counterinsurgency," "civic action," and "nation building" concepts, promoted by the policy of the United States towards Latin America.

In January 1961, a key paper, prepared by the State Department Policy Planning Staff, stated a new concept for hemispheric defense and development:

"The U.S. should undertake (a) to phase out programs in which Latin American forces are unrealistically associated in continental defense roles and (b) to influence Latin American military leaders towards greater emphasis on maintaining intra-hemispheric peace and contributing to the internal development of their countries....Towards this end, the U.S. should start the process of convincing the Latin American military - however long it may take- that their most patriotic role, and their true defense role, lies in executing a concept of defense through development, with all that this entails." (Child, 1980, p.148)

Augusto Varas, in analyzing these theories, said:

"The involvement of the armed forces is incorporated into the very definition of the goals of the people and the state, and the intervention of the armed forces is imperative when these objectives (as evaluated by the military) are threatened." (Varas, 1985, p.18)

These concepts neatly fit the model of "moderating pattern", introduced by Stepan and discussed in chapter I.

Child also comments about the same subject and the linkage of "reformist military" in Latin America:

"The causal relationship between Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) and military reformists is of course impossible to prove, but several observers have suggested that the linkage is in fact a valid one." (Child, 1980, p.191/192)

I strongly believe that this causal relationship does exist.

In 1962, the IADB obtained the creation of the Inter-American Defense College, which focused its syllabus on the strategic, economic, social, and political problems of the Americas, thus giving a broader aspect to military functions.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, Argentina was the first Latin American nation that helped in the blockade, sending two destroyers, several Navy and Air Force aircraft, and Army forces. For a military government, it was easier to commit forces to the hemisphere defense. This crisis was an example not only of successful solution through good civilian control of the military in the U.S., but also of good Inter-American relations. The government in office in Argentina at that time was the result of the coup of 1962, which ousted President Frondizi because of his rapprochement to communist Cuba.

In 1965, the Dominican Republic crisis was a turning point in the IAMS, because the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was

seen as a cover for U.S. American intervention. Although Argentina seriously considered sending troops, the nomination of a Brazilian general as commander of the IAPF weighed against their participation.

In 1967, after the ouster of President Illia, the military government of Argentina proposed to institutionalize the IAMS and strengthen their links to the Organization of American States (OAS), claiming it would provide a military and political balance by improving the economic factor and would also provide for better ties to the political organs of the Inter-American System. The initiative was once again rejected, on the basis of opposing the "militarization" of the OAS.

After the coup of 1966, the military government of General Onganía put in practice in 1967 the reorganization of the Army and the "Europe Plan" for the armed forces, which was designed basically to "buy" security in the European market. It provided certain independence, but it was obviously very expensive. Based on new technologies on the "cutting edge" of European standards, the assets were bought, in general, "off the shelves," with very scarce doctrine, procedures, and statistics attached. It was a very different concept compared to the old American weaponry, which included more background information such as tactical doctrine, procedures and war statistics. A big effort was made to adapt some previous American doctrine and develop our own in

order to use European weapons. Nevertheless, it brought improvement in fighting capabilities compared to the former situation, which was frustrating to some extent. As an example, we were provided with submarines but no torpedo warheads, or only samples of live artillery ammunition rounds for the surface combatants. The tradeoff was that arms expenses were increased several fold.

After the death of "Che" Guevara in October 1967, the defeat of the rural guerrilla "focos," and a stronger threat perception in South East Asia, Latin America, in general, Took a lower priority in U.S policy. Especially during the Nixon and Ford years, U.S./Argentina military interaction was very weak.

During the antisubversive war against Marxism in Argentina, the Carter administration denounced violations of human rights by the military government and the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment was put in practice against Argentina, precluding any military aid from the United States. This action was seen by the military government as a unilateral judgment by the U.S. and a discrimination against Argentina. Child pointed out the discrimination toward Argentina, when:

"... other flagrant violators of human rights as Iran, the Philippines and South Korea, seemingly went unpenalized because of over-riding U.S. security or economic interest."(Child, 1980, p.212)

This situation was defined by an Argentine scholar as the "irrelevance of rationality" (Escude, 1984, p.35).

The end of 1981 saw one of the best moments in the relations of our military government with the new Reagan administration. In an unprecedented initiative, General Galtieri sent special forces to train the "Contras" in their struggle in Nicaragua. In one of the more important newspapers ("La Nacion"), an editorial stressed the outstanding level of relations between the two countries. The headline "Towards a new alliance?" was a legitimate question.

The worst period in the history of relations between Argentina and the United States was during the Malvinas/Falkland crisis and subsequent war in 1982. Military relations were severely damaged, due to the significant help provided by the United States to the United Kingdom. A major factor in the crisis was the misconception of General Galtieri that he was being backed by his counterparts in the Pentagon. In a very interesting article, David Feldman supported the thesis that:

"...the timing of the Malvinas invasion, and the subsequent miscalculation that the United States would tacitly assist Argentina, were partly shaped by U.S. policies." (Feldman, 1985, JISWA)

Despite the seriousness of the statement (and it is not the aim of this paper to prove it), I think it can be said that a

"military mind" in charge of the state of a peripheral nation, playing a statesman role with the whole power at hand, is a bad thing. However, it is worse if it is combined with a lack of acquaintance with the problems and peculiarities of this country by a superpower. It could result in a serious political failure for both, in this case Argentina and the United States.

With the arrival of a constitutional government in Argentina in 1983, relations between the two countries improved. From the military perspective, tensions were reduced and a better approach was established.

In the 1988 elections, President Menem was nominated for a new term, and he started a clear policy to improve relations with the United States.

On November 21, 1989, the U.S. Congress ratified that the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment (in force since 1981) was no longer in effect in the case of Argentina because of the significant improvement in human rights and the peaceful approach by President Menem to the Malvinas/Falkland conflict.

3. Drugs, as an example of Latin American military co-option.

During the 27th Conference of American Armies in November 1987, the American representatives were very interested in developing a military hemispheric organization to tackle the drug issue. This initiative was rejected by all the Latin American armies. At that time, they were competing with U.S. diplomats in the region (Varas, 1989, p.71).

Although the drug issue is not new, it is now "in fashion." It is also an element that can be taken as a common interest. Not an actual threat to all nations at the same level, it is certainly a common problem in the long run. As in any security alliance, a common thread is needed as the "raison d'etre" or an existence condition. With the East-West threat fading, this common danger is losing credibility and practical interest. The drug issue is a credible substitute, particularly to the countries that suffer the most in this common problem.

As a global perspective is the only way to counter the drug issue, it sounds reasonable to me that the Inter-American Military System should get organized behind that issue. However, the link between drugs, terrorism, and subversion makes the drug issue very sensitive.

In Argentina, neither political nor military perspectives are happy with internal military intervention. Nonetheless, when the very existence of any society is in jeopardy and police forces are overwhelmed, as it can be in the case of drugs in some countries, the whole nation is threatened. The armed forces, through a real professionalism, are then compelled to act, not on their own, but under political directives from the legitimate government.

An interesting interview held last September with U.S. Major General Bernard Loeffke, current President of the Inter-American Defense Board, leads me to believe that:

"...the 20 nations involved in the IADB, have different and own interests which makes harmony difficult"...[he complains about] the difficulties to negotiate shown by the majority of the military representatives ...."Also he made the comment: "nevertheless a weak alliance is better than no alliance at all. I support the general meaning of the four 'D,' which are the main points to work on and promote understanding: Democracy, Development, Defense and Dialogue."

Major General Loeffke indicates that drugs could be a common problem, and certain solution methods could be implemented through the IADB. He has already organized some related successful war games that had a good reception among the Staff and officers. In the interview, Major General Loeffke told me about the existence of a proposal to create a Commission, supplemented by voluntary delegates, to deal with the military



aspects of the drug issue. Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru have already agreed to be members.

Today, the Inter-American Defense System at least exists, but there is a real disconnection from their political entity, the OAS. The IADB:

"...boasts the largest budget of any of the OAS satellite entities. The Board is basically a training program for Latin American officers and has little functional role in the OAS deliberations since the Dominican intervention in 1965." (Scheman, JISWA, p.15)

Considering the difficulties in politico-military relations within the same country, not only in a Latin American one like Argentina, but also in the United States, it is easy to understand the almost unsurpassable difficulties to be solved in an international environment, where both the internal and external problems arise. The task is even worse (or even impossible) if "military minds" deny the possibility of reaching a compromise or negotiating.

In reality, because the organization has neither the power nor the means to act, national policy issues are not discussed. Recent history is a kind of repetition of the Dominican experience of 1965, and the Rio Treaty has become inoperable since Malvinas/Falkland, Grenada, and Panama because the United States became an active party in those conflicts.

The lack of political power delegated from the OAS to the IADB make this forum the interaction of only military policies, with inflexible perceptions and little hope of understanding. Only through fluid civil-military relations in each country and with civilianized military minds in the IADB, would it be possible to blend the real interests of the hemisphere in security matters. If the IADB is only a safety valve of military expression not related to political power, and:

"...democracy is the wave of the future in Latin America, there will be a decline of U.S. influence in military and security related matters." (Varas, 1989, p.71)

In other words, if the Inter-American Defense System is only a way to influence opinions of U.S. military clients outside of the political arena, then it is the wrong way to promote democracy. If military influence is being used to co-opt Argentine military by their U.S. counterpart, as a tool to accomplish U.S. national interests, and disregarding political perspectives of both countries, then militarization instead of democracy is being promoted.

I reaffirm my conviction of the need to provide political skills to senior officers as a way to allow them to understand such subjects, a proposal which is very far from the so-called "objective control".

#### 4. Summary.

Despite some substantial differences between the two cultures, military minds of Argentine and United States military are rather alike. The formal arena of interaction, the IADB, has not the proper linkage with the political level, the OAS. At the moment, the IADB is only an officers' training program and a forum to discuss only military policies between the different militaries of the Western Hemisphere. The National Security Doctrine sponsored by the United States was functional for a U.S. policy fight against communism; at the same time it militarized the governments of the region and encouraged a sort of "moderating pattern." The Cuban Missile Crisis and the training of the "Contras" were the only times that Argentina committed actual forces to be at the side of the U.S. military. The Malvinas/Falkland war marked the worst period among U.S. and Argentine military. It is probable that the good relations of General Galtieri with his counterparts in the Pentagon allowed him to misperceive the U.S. support to the Malvinas occupation in April 1982.

Because the East-West conflict has faded, the drug issue can be taken as a common threat to the hemisphere. Unless the politics of the region agree in this assessment, all the efforts of U.S. military to co-opt their Latin American counterparts will

erode politico-military relations of those countries and, worst of all, the very concept of democracy in the region.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The "objective civilian control" of the military is a concept of the past, not only for superpowers but also for developing nations. To avoid political and military mistakes, it should be replaced by a fusionist concept, in which the military influences decisions through "participatory control" or politicization from within.

Politicians and military personnel must understand that their respective fields, like any other field, do not have clear-cut boundaries. It is mandatory to interact as boundary spanners to reach mutual understanding and compromise. Mahan envisioned a naval officer prepared for statesmanship, a need that is now evident, due to sophistication and complexity of conflict and war. Permanent communication, acquaintance, and further acceptance of mutual roles is the way to create confidence and respect between the military and politicians as an ideal base for such interaction. The military would have the hardest part, in accordance with their "military mind," which is alien to negotiation and in general sees problems in black and white. In addition, the so-called irreplaceable "victory" must be deeply analyzed, to update the military approach to war. Both concepts

are "fundamental military-political assumption" to be reconsidered.

The concept of military professionalism must include political skills, not accepting "multifarious civilian" ideologies seeking for "subjective control," but recognizing political science as a functional body of knowledge, useful to consider top level military matters. In that regard, conflict theory should be studied by the military to expand its comprehension.

Jointness is a military power multiplier and a must to improve effectiveness, but this enhanced power should be balanced by politicians skillful in military matters, otherwise civilian control of the military will be in jeopardy.

Frequent military coups experienced in Argentina seriously damaged the viability of the nation and in the end were clear failures in all cases. Only through a democratic learning process, both civilians and military would change behavior and thereby improve society's political culture.

Although the Stepan model of "moderating pattern" depicts realities of Argentine past experiences, it is not a healthy model to be followed in the future. The exception cannot be the

rule; otherwise the exceptionality criteria lose their identity and validity.

Despite the fact that, during the last two wars suffered by Argentina, the military had the power of the nation at hand, both outcomes resulted in political defeat. It is evident that the political skills of the leaders were not in accordance with the problems to be solved. As a result, and as an example of misunderstanding of the military by politicians, President Alfonsín overreacted against the military, surpassing the limits of prudence, eroding deep feelings of the armed forces, and leading to the "planteos." At the beginning, he misunderstood the problem, but finally acknowledged the military explicitly in a speech after the subversive attack of "La Tablada." He implicitly justified the "dirty war" in retrospect.

Civil-military relations in Argentina, paradoxically, are much better now with the new Peronist government than with the Radical administration. After the "Revolucion Libertadora" (1955), the military had neglected Peronism, but political reality is arising now and the learning process of democracy is giving better results. Periodic interruptions of that process precluded improvement and political accountability vanished.

The Argentine and United States military have not only significant differences but also basic similarities rooted in a

common "military mind." It should be noted that, after World War II, the United States military was the "model" for its Argentine counterparts. Military relations between the two countries have been better in general terms than the relations between their governments. The East-West conflict and its local manifestations in Argentina favored the "alignment" of the military with its U.S. American counterpart.

The National Security Doctrine, promoted by the United States during the 1960's, when blended with the local interpretation is anathema for the politicians in Argentina, because they see it as the best excuse for totalitarianism. Military government in Argentina can easily create links with the U.S. military, and vice versa. Such linkage can be very disruptive if it is not in accord with national policies of both countries. It is a clear condition if democracy is to be consolidated.

Despite the fact that even the politico-military relations in the U.S. are not perfect, as Vietnam can show, the model is valid to improve the Argentine experience. Internal intervention of the armed forces is accepted in the United States, but in very exceptional cases within the democratic process. If we take it as a model for weaker democracies, we find that in the Argentine case both civilian and military factions were wrong: an oath to the constitution must be accepted by the military with no



constraints, but the politicians must also accept that they swear as well, to fight any domestic enemy.

Argentina never recognized the United States wars as in their direct interests (World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam). The Cuban missile crisis and later the military training support to the "Contras" were the only two cases of direct involvement of the Argentine armed forces on the U.S. side. Nor did the United States show any recognition of the recent Argentine wars (Malvinas and subversive war).

In the Inter-American environment, all initiatives to "institutionalize" the IAMS into the OAS have failed because of the general opposition to "militarize" the organization. At the moment it is just a bilateral forum to discuss only military policies. A new period of relative growth of the IAMS can be envisioned only if the drug issue is to be assessed as a common threat by the polity of the Inter-American countries.

## CHAPTER V

### EPILOGUE

Internal balance of power is one of the goals to be pursued by governments of any country. Civil-military relations are the key to achieve this aim. Argentina and the United States are no exceptions. Argentina is trying to consolidate political stability and find the proper place for the military after bad experiences. The United States, with global commitments, is also seeking to get a better civil-military equilibrium that fits the dilemma of a fast changing world; improvements are necessary to avoid new mistakes in that regard.

In my view, the formal involvement of the military in politics is essential to face modern conflict. They must participate. Participation is a way to be committed to a common task; insulation is an invitation to react, generally subjectively and with a narrow insight. Participation is a commitment to obey, margination is a way to encourage procedures alien to the system.

The "new thinking" of the Soviet Union is producing irreversible changes in the East-West conflict. The consequences

affect not only the superpowers, but Third World nations as well. A more diffuse threat will enhance a multipolar world; among other results, players will more clearly understand the Soviet Union and Soviet co-option will be more likely than before. Both models are apparently merging after the Soviet failure. The struggle between the superpowers from now on will be more in economic and political than military terms. The level of regional conflicts will increase, unless a more flexible approach prevails. The military has a key role to play.

Latin America needs to have more attention from the United States. Specifically, military interaction can be a vehicle to reinforce democratic values, not to promote militarization. Military men have the intrinsic responsibility to diminish the risks of misunderstanding; a fluid dialogue will reduce conflict rather than enhance it. A more mature relation, with a conceptually coherent policy, will encourage Latin American perspectives, both civilian and military, to believe that the concept of hemisphere can have some meaning other than geographical.

Conflict and war are not only too important to be left to generals, but also too important and too complex to be handled by any other profession alone. The solution should be sought by a combined effort.

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